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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jonathan Ross Mathews pleaded guilty to trafficking in marijuana, 
reserving the right to appeal the district court's order denying his motion to 
suppress. Mathews timely appeals, challenging that adverse ruling. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Corporal Bingham of the Idaho State Police pulled over Jonathan Ross 
Mathews for speeding in Twin Falls County, Idaho. (R., p. 9; 8/28/12 Tr., p. 17, 
Ls. 12-13.) As Mathews gathered his driver's license and registration, and 
searched for his proof of insurance, Bingham asked where Mathews was going 
and where he had been. (R., p. 9.) Mathews said he had gone to Reno, Nevada 
to gamble, and was going to Cheyenne, Wyoming then Lincoln, Nebraska before 
heading home to Lawrence, Kansas. (R., p. 9.) Bingham noticed several five-
hour energy drink bottles and food wrappers, as well as a road atlas, in Mathews' 
car. (R., p. 9; 8/28/12 Tr., p. 19, L. 18- p. 21, L. 13.) Mathews did not appear to 
be under the influence of any controlled substances. (8/28/12 Tr., p. 78, Ls. 12-
15.) 
When Bingham asked Mathews if he had any controlled substances in the 
car, Mathews removed his sunglasses, looked Bingham directly in the eye and 
responded "no," then faced forward, putting his glasses back on. (8/28/12 Tr., p. 
51, L. 11 - p. 57, L. 1.) Based on his drug interdiction training, Bingham found 
that the atlas, the energy drinks and food wrappers, Mathews' 100+ mile detour 
to Twin Falls en route from Reno to Cheyenne, and odd behavior were indicative 
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of criminal activity. (R., p. 9; 8/28/12 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 5-16; p. 22, Ls. 9-24; p. 75, 
Ls. 4-15.) Accordingly, Bingham called for assistance from the K9 unit. (R., p. 9; 
8/28/12 Tr., p. 75, Ls. 4-15.) 
Deputy Hoop arrived with a canine. (R., p. 10.) The dog did a free-air 
sniff around Bingham's car and alerted to the trunk. (R, p. 10.) When Bingham 
searched the trunk, he found roughly 23 packages of marijuana weighing roughly 
25 pounds total. (8/28/12 Tr., p. 82, L. 19- p. 83, L. 1; R., p. 10.) 
Mathews moved to suppress all evidence from his seizure, arguing it was 
obtained outside the permissible scope of his detention. (R., pp. 52-56.) The 
district court conducted an evidentiary hearing at which Bingham testified. (See 
8/28/12 Tr.) The district court entered a memorandum decision denying the 
motion. (R., pp. 74-87.) Mathews entered into a conditional plea agreement, 
reserving the right to appeal the district court's order denying his motion to 
suppress. (R., pp. 124-25.) 
The district court entered judgment, sentencing Mathews to a term of 12 




Mathews states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Mathews' motion to 
suppress the State's evidence? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Applying constitutional principles to the facts of this case, did the district court 
properly deny Mathews' motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
Applying Constitutional Principles To The Facts Of This Case, The District Court 
Properly Denied Mathews' Motion To Suppress 
When a decision on a suppression motion is challenged, the appellate 
court applies a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 
_, 301 P.3d 242, 251 (2013). The appellate court first accepts the trial court's 
factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence, then freely reviews 
the application of constitutional principles to those facts. kl The facts of this 
case are not disputed. Thus, the Court here need only apply the law to the 
agreed facts. 
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 302 P.3d 328, 331 (2012). To 
conduct an investigatory stop in accord with the Fourth Amendment, police must 
have "a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that 'criminal activity 
may be afoot .... "' U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). Reasonable suspicion is more than an inchoate hunch 
about criminal activity, but must be based on a particularized suspicion -
considering the totality of circumstances - that the one being stopped is engaged 
in wrongdoing. State v. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 1, 6, 217 P.3d 1, 6 (Ct. App. 2009). 
Mathews does not assert that his initial stop for speeding was improper. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 7.) Rather, Mathews challenges the validity of his continued 
detention to await the K9 unit's arrival. (Id.) "[W]here officers abandon the initial 
purpose of a routine traffic stop and extend it to allow for a drug dog search, the 
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extension must be justified by a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is 
afoot." State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405,409, 283 P.3d 722, 726 (2012). 
The district court found that Mathews' continued detention to allow the K9 
unit to arrive was justified by reasonable suspicion. (R., pp. 74-87.) In so 
concluding, the district court cited four factors. First, Mathews' car had several 
food wrappers and energy drink bottles, giving it a "lived in" appearance and 
indicating that Mathews was avoiding any stops. (R., p. 84.) Second, Mathews 
was using a map rather than a GPS, which Bingham testified helps police 
discover drug trafficking destinations, and is thus often avoided by drug 
traffickers. (R., p. 84.) Third, Mathews' travel plans were suspicious because 
his route was very circuitous, and his responses to Bingham's questions failed to 
explain his detour. (R., pp. 84-85.) Finally, Mathews' way of responding to 
Bingham's question about drugs was odd. (R., p. 85.) Taken as a whole, the 
district court reasoned, Bingham's suspicions justified Mathews' detention. (R., 
pp. 86-87.) Also, citing Exhibit 2, the district court noted that Mathews' detention, 
from initial stop to when the canine was deployed, was 21 minutes - a 
reasonable duration. (R., pp. 75, 79, 86-87.) 
The state hereby adopts the district court's reasoning as set forth in its 
decision, attached here as Appendix A. (R., pp. 74-87.) Given these 
considerations, Mathews has failed to show error. 
5 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Mathews' judgment of 
conviction, and the district court's order denying Mathews' motion to suppress 
DATED this 22nd day of July, 2013. 
~Nif=ff= 
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This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Evidence 
was presented to the court on Tuesday, August 28, 2012, and on Friday, August 31, 
2012. The defendant was personally present during these hearings and was represented 
by counsel, George Essma. Jill Sweesy represented the state. The Court has reviewed 
the materials submitted by the parties, researched the applicable law and heard oral 
argument. The motion for suppression of the evidence is DENIED. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 1 
000074 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
At approximately 1:27 p.m. on June 7, 2012, Trooper Aaron Bingham (Bingham) 
was on patrol for the Idaho State Police, working on U.S. Highway 93 in Twin Falls 
County. He was traveling southbound as he observed a white passenger car travelling 
northbound. Bingham estimated the vehicle's speed exceeded the sixty-mile-per-hour 
speed limit, traveling approximately sixty-five miles-per-hour. Bingham confirmed 
with radar the vehicle was traveling sixty-six miles-per-hour. Bingham initiated a 
traffic stop of the vehicle, which was licensed in Kansas. 
Just prior to stopping Mathews' vehicle, the video recorder in Bingham's patrol 
vehicle automatically activated and recorded1 the entirety of the stop. The video also 
includes the date and time information in the display. 
The recording showed that the time of the stop was 13:27:20, and the time that 
Bingham approached Mathews was 13:27:40. Bingham approached the vehicle on the 
driver's side and asked for documentation, including the driver's license, registration 
and insurance. Ultimately Bingham identified the driver as Jonathan Ross Mathews 
(Mathews), the defendant herein. Mathews wore sunglasses throughout his discussions 
with Bingham, except for a brief period that will be discussed herein. There were no 
other occupants in the vehicle. 
1 The video recording was admitted by stipulation (Exhibit 2). 
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While Bingham was waiting for Mathews' to provide the requested information, 
Bingham observed food wrappers on the passenger seat and floor board of the car. 
Bingham observed several five-hour energy drinks or containers from such drinks in 
the console and in the front passenger area of the car. Bingham also observed an atlas, 
opened to the map for Idaho. 
While at the door of the car, Bingham spoke with Mathews in a conversational 
way, asking about where Mathews had been, and where he was going. Mathews 
indicated he was coming from Reno and heading to Cheyenne Wyoming. By 13:29:15 
Bingham asked whether there were any controlled substances of any kind in the 
vehicle. Mathews answered in the negative. Bingham asked about marijuana, 
methampheatmine and cocaine, and at this point Mathews removed his sunglasses, 
stared straight into Bingham's eyes and again answered in the negative. This 
movement bothered Bingham and he characterized it as something that appeared 
staged. At 13:29:24 Mathews indicates that his insurance is "outdated" and he keeps 
looking for a current proof of insurance. 
While Mathews looked for more information, Bingham and Mathews continue to 
converse. Mathews indicated that he was staying at the Shilo Inn in Reno and that he 
had gambled in a gas station. When Bingham asks, "so you went all the way across the 
country to gamble at a gas station"? (at 13:30:16), Mathews makes an inaudible 
response, other than what this court could hear repeated by Bingham as "blackjack." 
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Bingham asked further questions based upon Mathews' answers. During 
Bingham's conversation with Mathews he learned that Mathews had traveled cross 
country from Kansas to Reno to gamble. Mathews was on his return trip, coming from 
Reno, Nevada, and heading to Cheyenne Wyoming, then back to Kansas via Lincoln, 
Nebraska. Mathews never indicated that he had a purpose to be traveling towards 
Twin Falls, Idaho. 
Bingham has training in drug interdiction. He has attended courses, in addition 
to standard and advanced POST training, that qualify him to offer opinions regarding 
indicia of potential drug trafficking. His classes included a "Desert Snow" class 
conducted in Pendelton, Oregon, and a ride-along with an interdiction officer in Utah. 
The court finds that Bingham is qualified through his training, experience and 
specialized knowledge to offer expert opinions pursuant to I.R.E. 702. The court further 
finds that Bingham's training, experience and specialized knowledge enabled him to 
form conclusions based upon his observations and the brief conversation while 
standing at the driver's side door of Mathews' vehicle. 
Bingham noted certain things that he looks for when detecting possible drug 
trafficking cases. Those include people on long trips, stories that are not plausible, 
energy drinks and pills of different sorts. Bingham indicated that he looks for cars with 
a "lived-in look" because drug traffickers are on the go, not stopping much. 
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Accordingly, maps, atlases, and people going out of their way on travel routes to 
possibly avoid an area are suspect. 
Bingham was eventually provided with proper insurance documentation and he 
returned to his patrol car at approximately 13:30:45. Based upon his observations, 
Bingham began, almost immediately attempting to locate a canine officer to come to his 
location. Bingham was aware that the local canine officers were involved in training at 
Filer High School, approximately 4-5 miles from where this stop occurred. Because the 
officers were in training, Bingham began dialing the officers directly on his cell phone at 
13:31:15 rather than using ISP dispatch to do so. After two officers expressed an 
inability to respond, Bingham reached Deputy Hoop of the Twin Falls County Sheriff's 
office at 13:35:30. Deputy Hoop indicated that he was at the training, but that he would 
break away and bring his certified canine to conduct a free-air sniff. 
Shortly before speaking with Hoop on the telephone, Bingham had a brief 
discussion with another Idaho State Police officer, Trooper DeBie, who had arrived on 
the scene. Trooper DeBie thereafter spoke with Mathews while Bingham was on the 
telephone. DeBie2 testified at the hearing, but his conversation at the scene was not 
presented to the court by way of a recording. 
At 13:36:19 Bingham submitted information to dispatch regarding Mathews so 
that Mathews' personal information could be verified. Bingham also entered such 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 5 
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information in his computer located in his vehicle. Bingham requested dispatch run a 
driver's check, a warrants check, and "triple I," which is a report designed to detect 
potential drug trafficking or movement, including a detailed criminal history on the 
potential suspect. 
Deputy Hoop arrived at approximately 13:44. Bingham informed Hoop what he 
had learned in his conversation with Mathews. Hoop then approached Mathews at 
approximately 13:45 and conversed with Mathews for approximately one minute. 
Hoop then deployed his canine at 13:46:48. 
During a free-air sniff by the canine, the dog indicated that narcotics were 
located in Mathews' vehicle at approximately 13:48:08. In the course of the search 
based on the dog's signal , the officers located approximately twenty-five (25) pounds of 
marijuana hidden in the trunk of Mathews' car. 
Mathews urges this court to suppress all evidence seized as a result of the traffic 
stop, asserting the officer illegally extended the duration of the stop by asking questions 
about Mathews' travel, destinations, and drugs, and by waiting for the drug dog to 
arrive. The state asserts that the extension was necessary to complete the purpose of the 
traffic stop. 
2 DeBie's information came after Bingham had decided to contact a canine officer; therefore, this court concludes 
that his observations and testimony do not aid the court in making its determinations in this case. 
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ANALYSIS 
I. Trooper Bingham's Questions about Drug Activity and Mathews' 
Travel History did not Unreasonably Delay the Traffic Stop. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 17 of 
the Idaho Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.3 The purpose of 
the Fourth Amendment is "to impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of 
discretion by government officials, including law enforcement agents, in order to 
'safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions."' State v. 
Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886, 888, 187 P.3d 1261, 1263 (Ct.App.2008) (quoting Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54, 99 S.Ct. 1291, 1395-96 (1979)). "Stopping an automobile and 
detaining its occupants constitutes a' seizure' even if the purpose of the stop is limited 
and the detention quite brief." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653-54, 99 S.Ct. at 1395-96; 
State v. Luna, 126 Idaho 235,237,880 P.2d 265,267 (Ct.App.1994). An investigative 
detention "must be justified by a reasonable suspicion, derived from specific articulable 
facts, that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime." Florida v. Royer, 460 
U.S. 491, 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324 (1983); State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848,853, 11 P.3d 44, 49 
(Ct.App.2000). 
3 Although Mathews contends that both the Idaho and United States constitutions were violated, he provides no 
cogent reason why Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution should be differently applied in this case. 
Therefore, this court relies on judicial interpretation of the Fourth amendment in its analysis of Mathews' claims. 
See State v. Schaffer, 133 Idaho 126, 130, 982 P .2d 961, 965 (Ct.App. 1999). 
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Although a vehicle stop is limited in magnitude compared to other types of 
seizures, it is nonetheless a II constitutionally cognizable" intrusion and therefore may 
not be conducted "at the unbridled discretion of law enforcement officials." Prouse, 440 
U.S. at 661, 99 S.Ct. at 1397. Because a traffic stop is limited in scope and duration, it is 
analogous to an investigative detention and is analyzed under the principles set forth in 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968). See State v. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641, 181 P.3d 
1249 (Ct.App.2008). 
''During the course of a lawful traffic stop, general questioning on topics 
unrelated to the purpose of the stop is permissible as long as it does not expand the 
duration of the stop." Ramirez, 145 Idaho at 889, 187 P.3d at 1264. Moreover, "[bJrief, 
general questions about drugs and weapons, in and of themselves, do not extend an 
otherwise lawful detention." Id. at 890, 187 P.3d at 1265. Here, this court finds that the 
brief, general questions, which Bingham asked about Mathews' route of travel, where 
he stayed in Reno, where he gambled, where he was going and whether there were any 
drugs in the car, were not improper for two reasons. First, Bingham initially asked his 
questions while he was waiting for a correct proof of insurance. These questions, then, 
did not delay the stop in any way. Second, even if the questions came after proper 
insurance had been provided, the very brief detention thereafter to ask questions was 
proper. Again, as set forth by the Court in Ramirez: 
During [the] Trooper['s] first encounter with Ramirez, he asked 
Ramirez for his driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 8 
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Trooper Bennett inquired into Ramirez's destination, where he was 
coming from, and the circumstances under which he came to be driving 
the van. These questions about destination and ownership were 
legitimately posed by Trooper Bennett to investigate the traffic stop. 
Trooper Bennett then asked Ramirez how many pounds of 
methamphetamine he was transporting and repeated the question as to 
marijuana, cocaine, and heroin. Although these additional questions about 
drugs were direct and specific, rather than general in nature, they were 
not impermissible. 
Id. at 890, 187 P.3d at 1265. 
The Court concluded that the Trooper's few questions about destination, 
ownership of the vehicle and drugs were asked in a matter of seconds and were 
objectively reasonable. Similarly, Bingham's questioning, while also observing the 
wrappers, energy drinks, and atlas, were objectively reasonable given the answers 
Mathews was giving him, and what Bingham has been trained to observe in drug 
interdiction work. These questions were not impermissible according to Ramirez, 
above.4 
Therefore, the traffic stop was not impermissibly delayed by the questions 
Bingham asked Mathews. Thus, the court denies Mathews' motion insofar as it relates 
to the questions posed by Bingham. 
4 It is somewhat unclear when Mathews provided proper insurance. Bingham testified to points their conversation 
where Bingham was asking questions and had not yet received the proof of insurance. However, the testimony was 
unclear as to the precise point in which Bingham received adequate insurance documentation-whether it was 
before or after the drug-related questions. 
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II. Trooper Bingham had Reasonable Suspicion to Delay the Stop to 
Obtain a Drug Dog. 
The actions taken by Bingham after obtaining information from Mathews did not 
irnperrnissibly delay the stop. Any routine traffic stop might turn up suspicious 
circumstances that could justify an officer asking further questions unrelated to the 
stop. State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608,613, 798 P.2d 453,458 (Ct.App.1990). "The officer's 
observations, general inquiries, and events succeeding the stop may-and often do-
give rise to legitimate reasons for particularized lines of inquiry and further 
investigation by an officer." State v. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886,889, 187 P.3d 1261, 1264 
(Ct.App. 2008). Accordingly, the length and scope of the initial investigatory detention 
may be lawfully expanded if there exist objective and specific articulable facts that 
justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in 
criminal activity. Id. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals recently set forth the analytical framework for issues 
like those Mathews presents here in State v. Ramirez, id. Regarding potential extensions 
of an investigative detention the Court noted: 
An investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer 
than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. . . . There is no rigid 
time-limit for determining when a detention has lasted longer than 
necessary; rather, a court must consider the scope of the detention and the 
law enforcement purposes to be served, as well as the duration of the stop. 
. . . Where a person is detained, the scope of detention must be carefully 
tailored to its underlying justification .... The scope of the intrusion 
permitted will vary to some extent with the particular facts and 
circumstances of each case. . . . However, brief inquiries not otherwise 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 10 
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related to the initial purpose of the stop do not necessarily violate a 
detainee's Fourth Amendment rights .... Any routine traffic stop might 
turn up suspicious circumstances that could justify an officer asking 
further questions unrelated to the stop .... The officer's observations, general 
inquiries, and events succeeding the stop may-and often do-give rise to 
legitimate reasons for particularized lines of inquiry and further investigation by 
an officer. Accordingly, the length and scope of the initial investigatory detention 
may be lawfully expanded if there exist objective and specific articulable facts that 
justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in 
criminal activity. 
145 Idaho at 889, 187 P.3d at 1264 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
The question here is whether II objective and specific articulable facts" existed 
that justified Bingham's extension of the stop to obtain the services of a drug dog. This 
court holds that such facts exist here. 
There were various factors that gave Bingham reasonable suspicion. First, 
Bingham was trained to look for the things that he saw in Mathews' vehicle: food 
wrappers, energy drinks-generally, an appearance of a car being "lived in" and that 
the driver was in a hurry to arrive at his destination. 
Second, Bingham saw a map of Idaho on the passenger seat. Bingham testified 
that traffickers prefer maps and atlases instead of GPS systems because GPS systems 
require destination information that could lead the police to other suspects or more 
evidence if the police catch a trafficker in route. 
Third, Mathews' travel plans were suspect. When asked about where he came 
from and what he was doing there, Mathews told Bingham that he drove cross-
MEMORANDUM DECISION 11 
000084 
country from Kansas to Reno, Nevada, to gamble in a gas station.5 When Bingham 
asked Mathews where he was headed, Mathews said he was traveling to Kansas from 
Reno, via Cheyenne and Lincoln. Bingham knew that the most direct route from Reno 
to Cheyenne was on Interstate 80 through Utah-a section of interstate that is well-
known for being patrolled for drug trafficking and could compel a trafficker to go far 
out of his way to avoid detection there. 6 7 
Fourth, Bingham's suspicion was further triggered by Mathews' odd way of 
answering Bingham's questions about drugs by removing his sunglasses, looking 
Bingham in the eye and answering, then putting the sunglasses back on. 
The reasonableness of the officer's suspicion must be evaluated based upon the 
totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop. State v. Roe, 140 Idaho at 181, 90 
P.3d at 931. This standard requires less than probable cause but more than mere 
speculation or instinct on the part of the officer. Id. "An officer may draw reasonable 
inferences from the facts in his or her possession, and those inferences may be drawn 
from the officer's experience and law enforcement training." Id. 
5 The court notes, as Bingham also noted, that Kansas is to the east of Nevada and Reno is on the western side of 
Nevada. Therefore, not only did Mathews' story make it seem that he drove across the country to gamble at a gas 
station, but he had also traveled across the entire state of Nevada to gamble at a gas station. 
6 Mathews argued that his detour from a direct route to Cheyenne should not be factored into reasonable suspicion as 
he could have been heading to Twin Falls for am~ of reasons. However, the court finds that argument 
unsupported by the facts. When the officer asked where Mathews was heading, he said ''Cheyenne." The court 
believes it is reasonable to presume that had he been heading to Twin Falls-for example, to visit a friend-the 
answer would have been "Twin Falls." By Mathews' own answer, he was driving to Cheyenne and not anywhere in 
southern Idaho. 
7 The unexplained detour was even more suspicious when combined with the items visible in Mathews' car-energy 
drinks, food wrappers, and an atlas- that appeared to show he was in a hurry to reach his destination. 
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As this court has already noted, Bingham had training in drug interdiction, in the 
things to look for and the questions to ask a detainee regarding drug use, travel 
destinations, routes, etc. The answers given and the objectively reasonable facts visible 
to Bingham at the time of the stop support the suspicion necessary to take further action 
and to investigate the activity that was afoot. This court recognizes that suspicion is not 
justified if the conduct observed by the officer falls within the broad range of what can 
be described as normal driving behavior. Id. While each factor Bingham observed or 
found out may be normal individually, the combination of the factors here was not 
normal behavior, and was sufficient to trigger reasonable suspicion that a crime had 
been, or was about to be committed. 
Once this information was either observed or obtained through Mathews' 
responses, Bingham had reasonable suspicion that Mathews was transporting drugs. At 
that point, Bingham could investigate the crime of drug trafficking and was no longer 
bound by the strictures of issuing a speeding ticket. Therefore, from the time, that 
Bingham ended his conversation with Mathews at Mathews' window, Bingham had 
reasonable suspicion of drug activity and was permitted to investigate. 
The court notes that from the time of the stop until the drug dog indicated on the 
car, approximately twenty-one minutes had elapsed. See State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 
913, 917, 42 P.3d 706, 710 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that being detained for forty-nine 
minutes from the beginning of a traffic stop to a drug dog's arrival was reasonable for a 
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diligent investigation by officers). Therefore, Bingham's actions in investigating his 
suspicion were efficient and reasonable. 
Bingham had reasonable suspicion and acted on that suspicion reasonably. 
CONCLUSION 
Bingham had probable cause to stop Mathews for speeding along Highway 93. 
Bingham thereafter developed reasonable, articulable suspicion sufficient to justify 
further investigation by summoning a drug dog. The time taken to do so was not 
unreasonable. The motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the stop is therefore 
DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DA TED this _£_ day of September, 2012. 
District Judge 
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